Moscow and Peiping pushed their quarrel to a new crescendo—perhaps to a point of no return—in April of 1964. Mao Tse-tung called Nikita Khrushchev a rebel and lunatic and vowed he would liquidate him. Khrushchev labeled Mao a dictator and an idiot.
This language is the most unrestrained since the two Communist powers failed to settle their differences a year ago. At the end of November, 1963, it appeared some accommodation might be in sight. The Russian Communist Party sent a message to Peiping suggesting increased trade, technical assistance to Peiping, and talks on the border dispute, ideological disagreement, and name- calling. At the same time, Moscow stopped its attack on Peiping.
The Chinese Communists did not answer immediately but desisted from polemics. From mid-December to last February there was virtual silence on the ideological front.
Then, on February 4, Peiping published its seventh open letter denouncing Soviet leaders as separationists and rejecting Moscow's leadership of the Communist camp. As conditions for compromise, the Chinese Communists demanded the Russians throw out Khrushchev's line and, in fact, yield to Peiping's leadership.
Russia's reply was held up by a Rumanian mediation attempt that failed. On March 31, 1964, the Chinese Communists published their eighth open letter, maintaining Khrushchev was a traitor to the Communist revolution and calling on world Communists to work for his ouster.
On April 3, Pravda hit back with a speech party ideologist Mikhail Suslov had made February 14 but which had been withheld. It called the demand for Khrushchev's ouster "a terrible insult to our party and the Soviet people. "
Suslov accused Peiping of Nazism, adventurism, vicious slander, subversive activities, and arrogance. He charged the Chinese Communists were trying to create a personality cult around Mao so he "should, like Stalin in his day, sit aloft like god above all the Marxist-Leninist parties."
Khrushchev personally entered the exchange of polemics. In a two-week period in April, he made 10 speeches denouncing Peiping and with other Communist parties, signed two statements condemning Peiping.
Less Friendly
Russia's new tone was less conciliatory than that of late 1963. Suslov said the struggle between Moscow and Peiping would be long and hard. In his 70th birthday speech, Khrushchev said there was always opportunity for rapprochement and understanding, but that it was not to be obtained by concession of principle but by correct explanation and interpretation of Marxist-Leninist teaching.
Since April, 1964, the main Soviet target has been Mao Tse-tung. The Russians have sought to isolate the Chinese Communists from other Communist parties and Mao from other members of his own party. At the same time, Moscow has applied increasing political and economic pressure.
Moscow's Position
Khrushchev's line has won the backing of most Communist parties, but Mao's advocacy of violent world conquest seems to have a fascination for Asian Communists. It is estimated that 60 of the 90 world Communist parties have supported Moscow and only about 10 have backed Peiping all the way. The rest are vague or neutral.
The Chinese Communists base their case on opposition to Khrushchev's revisionism. They consider that Communist parties can be classified into four categories: stubborn, bewildered, cheated, and subjugated. Peiping's strategy is to isolate those in the first category and win over the rest in an indefinite period of time.
Khrushchev seeks a world congress to take advantage of his majority. Peiping wants none of this strategy, suggesting instead that the conference with Moscow be resumed in October, to be followed by a 17-party preparatory meeting for the international congress.
Of the Soviet satellites, only Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia have supported Russia's proposal for the congress of parties this fall. Most parties oppose Russia on the ground that a hasty congress would only deepen the schism. Eventually, Peiping may respond—and bid for support of the other parties by actually sitting down with the Russians once more.
Slow Deterioration
The Moscow-Peiping deterioration has been under way for many years, although for a long time it was submerged and not visible. During the Stalin era the Chinese Communists were compelled to conclude many unequal treaties with Moscow, including the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen, mining rights in Sinkiang, administration of the Changchun railroad, and civil aviation rights. Soviet influence was accepted in Manchuria and Sinkiang. Khrushchev abrogated some of these agreements and granted Mao more economic and technical aid than Stalin did.
At first, Mao went along with the solidification of Khrushchev's control. But when the cult of Stalin was liquidated and the principle of peaceful coexistence proposed at the 20th National Congress of the Russian Communist Party in February, 1956, Mao began to balk. However, at the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in September, 1956, Peiping temporarily accepted coexistence so as not to rock the Communist boat.
Kinmen Attack
Exchange of verbal attacks began at the 1957 Communist Congress in Moscow. In June, 1957, the Chinese Communists adopted an extreme left-leaning domestic policy. This was severely criticized by Khrushchev, who told Western visitors enforcement of the "people's commune" was a blunder.
In August, 1958, the Chinese Communists began saturation shelling of Kinmen. Khrushchev provided no assistance. On the contrary, he discouraged military action against Taiwan for fear it would lead to nuclear war with the United States. The Chinese Communists replied that the United States was a "paper tiger".
Also involved in the Moscow-Peiping quarrel were sharply divergent attitudes toward Yugoslavia's Tito and Khrushchev's assistance to Nehru when Peiping was attacking along the Indian border.
In June, 1959, Russian Communists revoked the defense technical agreement with Peiping and refused to provide samples and technical know-how for atomic bomb production. Peiping still does not have the bomb.
Failure of Khrushchev-Mao talks in 1959 expedited the split. In April, 1960, the Chinese Communist published several lengthy statements attacking Khrushchev. Moscow hit back.
Albanian Symbol
The Bucharest conference of 12 Communist parties in June, 1960, brought no results, but led to the world congress in November. After bitter debate, a compromise resolution—called the Moscow Declaration—was worked out.
The next climax was at the 20th Russian Communist Party Congress in October, 1961. Pro-Moscow parties attacked the Communist Party of Albania as a symbol for Peiping. Chinese Communist representatives returned the attack and later withdrew from the congress. When Moscow broke diplomatic ties with Albania, Peiping gave the Albanians more economic aid.
During the April-September period of 1962, behind-the-scenes talks were in progress. But Khrushchev's attitude toward Tito and Cuba infuriated Mao.
At first cautiously, then boldly, the Chinese Communists began to set up themselves in opposition to the Soviet Communists. In the duel, Khrushchev made use of Communist parties in Bulgaria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and West Germany, while Mao had support from North Korea and Albania. However through 1962 and the first half of 1963, the Chinese Communists still refrained from calling Khrushchev by name.
The masks did not come off until the summer of 1963 when each side attacked the other openly. The Moscow-Peiping talks in July, 1963, failed to solve anything.
Power Struggle
Immediately after the Bucharest conference of 1960, Moscow had applied strong political and economic pressures against Peiping. That July, Russia withdrew 1,390 specialists and revoked 257 technical assistance projects. Trade between Moscow and Peiping began to fall. In 1957, volume was US$2 billion. By 1963, the amount was US$400 million. Military aid was down sharply.
Can the free world benefit from the "great schism"? That depends on the wisdom of the West. It must be remembered that Khrushchev and Mao are engaged in a personal struggle for power. The violent accusations of dogmatism, revisionism, adventurism, capitulationism, separationism, and others are only tactical weapons. For the two, it is a battle to the death. But the Communist systems themselves have feet of clay.
Talking for Time
Mao is in the weaker position. He could not form a strong Communist bloc, even if he won. At home, his position is precarious. Twenty to thirty per cent of the Chinese people on the mainland once were landowners and well-to-do farmers now impoverished by Mao's regime. Popular discontent is also found in the army, as revealed in secret information obtained by the United States. Considering the unbroken succession of agricultural and economic failures since 1959, there is every indication that Mao's rule is nearing an end.
Mao is not strong enough to break off with Moscow. No matter when the world congress of Communists is held, or what its decision, Mao is expected to use his old tactic 'of "fight fight, talk talk." For the Chinese Communists, talks are not an interruption of hostilities but a maneuver to gain time and regroup their forces.
The People's Daily wrote, after the fruitless Moscow talks of July, 1963: "If the differences cannot be resolved today, then they can wait until tomorrow; if they cannot be resolved this year, then they can wait until next year... If we cannot finish the talks in one session, then we can hold several sessions. "
More important to the West is the fact that nothing will change the Communist goal of world conquest. As long as the Communist Party exists, there is the threat of world revolution through "peaceful transition" or violence. Whether or not the dispute of Moscow and Peiping leads to final breakdown makes less difference to the West than the fact that one Communist faction survives. Both Khrushchev and Mao give full support to Castro's aggressive policy. Chinese Communist conspiracies in Vietnam and Laos have not been discouraged by Moscow.
Peiping's internal crisis is so grave that Mao requires immediate offensive action to shift the pressure. Khrushchev believes Russia can survive a period of supposed coexistence and undermine the free world with infiltration and subversion. The West must be aware that the difference in Communist parties is only their timetable of conquest. If the free world relaxes, the Communists will unite long enough for the burial service. Even if they claw and rend each other after that, it will be too late for the democracies.